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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
LEONARD BLACK and VERA JOHN-
SON, also known as Vera Johnson 
Black, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
DAVID F. ANDERSON, Judge of the 
Juvenile Court of Washington County, 
State of Utah, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 
8234 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Vera Johnson also known as Vera Johnson Black is the 
polygamous wife of Leonard Black and from this unlawful 
relationship there have been born eight children ranging, 
now, from eighteen to two years of age. Subsequent to the 
so-called "Short Creek Raid" by Arizona State authorities, 
these children, the eldest being seventeen years of age, 
were declared and adjudged in juvenile court to be neglected 
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children within the meaning of the laws of Utah (R. 7). 
That court held, in part: 
"That the home of Leonard Black and Vera 
Johnson Black at Short Creek, Utah, is an immoral 
environment for the rearing of said children. 
"That Leonard Black, the father, and Vera 
Johnson Black, the mother of said children, have 
each knowingly failed and neglected to provide for 
said children the proper maintenance, care, training 
and education contemplated and required by both 
law and morals. 
"That both the public welfare and the welfare 
of the children requires that the rights of custody 
and control over said children be taken from their 
parents" (R. 13, 14). 
The parents, above referred to, were thereupon deprived 
of their custody and control over said children and the 
children made wards of the juvenile court and subjected to 
the continuing jurisdiction of that court. The right of 
custody and control over said ch'ildren was awarded to the 
Utah State Department of Public Welfare, said depart-
ment being authorized and instructed to place the children 
in suitable foster homes; provided, however: 
"* * * that said children may remain in 
the actual custody of their parents upon the follow-
ing conditions, and only upon said conditions, to-wit: 
"(a) That the parents and each of them shall 
at all times comply with the laws of Utah relating 
to marriage and sexual offenses. 
"(b) That the parents and each of them shall 
at all times refrain from counseling, encouraging 
and advising the children to violate the laws of 
Utah relating to marriage and sexual offenses. 
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"(c) That the parents and each of them shall 
counsel and advise the children to obey the laws of 
Utah relating to marriage and sexual offenses. This 
requirement shall not be satisfied by the pretense of 
telling the children that they have 'free agency', but 
it is intended that the parents shall affirmatively 
encourage their children to abide by the laws of 
Utah, and that the children should do so in disre-
gard to any religious doctrines to the contrary. 
* * *" (R. 8). 
Of the above recited conditions the parents complained by 
writ of habeas corpus, issued out of this Honorable Court 
and made returnable before the Fourth Judicial District 
Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honor-
able William Stanley Dunford presiding. There were other 
matters raised in the complaint for said writ but with 
which, in this cause, we are not concerned. This appeal is 
being taken solely for the purpose of determining what the 
law is, in this State, as to the matters subject to review 
or collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings. 
There is now in process an appeal from the ruling of 
the juvenile court in this cause which will concern itself 
with all other issues of which these respondents complain. 
Your appellants here seek only this Court's guidance in the 
handling of similar cases, with which the juvenile courts 
of this State are now faced or in which they may herein-
after become involved. The Honorable Judge of the Fourth 
Judicial District ordered, adjudged and decreed : 
"(a) That the judgment of the Juvenile Court 
of 'Vashington County, State of Utah, made and 
entered on or about the 11th day of May, 1954, is 
null and void as in violation of the Amendments 
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One and Fourteen of the Constitution of the United 
States of America, and in violation of Sections 1-4-7 
of Article One of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah, and in derogation of the plaintiffs' rights of 
freedom of speech and freedom of religion. 
" (b) That the custody of the children of the 
plaintiffs is hereby restored to their parents, the 
plaintiffs, upon the conditions, pending the appeal 
of the above entitled case, that the parents do not 
live together as man and wife, that they retain the 
custody of the children within the geographic bounds 
of the State of Utah and return them to this court 
or to any other court which may have jurisdiction 
at any time that they are ordered by said court to 
do so" (R. 45, 46). 
We concede that the writ of habeas corpus did lie and was 
properly made returnable before the district court and 
further that that court could properly consider and adjudi-
cate the legality of the restraint. However, we think that 
the district court did err, after having considered the 
legality of the restraint and ruled thereupon, by proceeding 
thereafter to adjudicate questions going to the qualifica-
·tions and fitness of the parents to retain custody of their 
children. Counsel for defendants made objection to this 
collateral attack and review of the findings of the juvenile 
court (R. 25, 26), and we here renew that objection. We 
complain of that portion of the findings of fact of the 
district court, made as follows: 
* * * * * 
"7. That the plaintiffs and parents of the said 
children, Leonard Black and Vera Johnson Black, 
are with the single exception of the alleged practice 
of plural marriage, people of high moral character 
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and integrity, and that the community in which they 
live is void from many of the evils that beset more 
populous communities such as smoking, drinking, 
divorce, unemployment, juvenile vandalism, thievery 
and juvenile delinquency and that it is for the best 
interest of the said children to be in their homes at 
Short Creek under the custody of their parents, the 
plaintiffs in the above entitled action" (R. 43). 
* * * * * 
for the reason and upon the ground that such a finding 
was made upon matters reviewable upon appeal from the 
order of the juvenile court, but not subject to review or 
collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings. 
It would serve no useful purpose to recite the facts 
presented to the Fourth Judicial District Court. We con-
fine ourselves to the principle of law involved and need not 
impose upon this Court the onerous task of studying the 
transcript. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE JUVENILE COURT 
NULL AND VOID AS IN VIOLATION OF 
AMENDMENTS ONE AND FOURTEEN OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA AND OF ARTICLE 
ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REVIEWING IN 
HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS THE FIND-
INGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
OF THE JUVENILE COURT AS TO SUBJECT 
MATTER RELATING TO FITNESS OF PAR-
ENTS TO HAVE CUSTODY OF CHILDREN. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE JUVENILE COURT 
NULL AND VOID AS IN VIOLATION OF 
AMENDMENTS ONE AND FOURTEEN OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA AND OF ARTICLE 
ONE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
A companion case pending before this Honorable Court, 
titled "State of Utah, In the Interest of Elsie Johnson 
Black, et al.," seeks an adjudication of the constitutionality 
of the judgment of the juvenile court as declared void in 
the proceedings from which we here appeal. Therefore, 
appellants request the Court's permission to waive argu-
ment on this Point I for the reason that the said companion 
case will. resolve that issue. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REVIEWING IN 
HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS THE FIND-
INGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
OF THE JUVENILE COURT AS TO SUBJECT 
MATTER RELATING TO FITNESS OF PAR-
ENTS TO HAVE CUSTODY OF CHILDREN. 
The Utah statute, 55-10-5, U. C. A. 1953, provides in 
part: 
"The juvenile court shall have exclusive original 
jurisdiction in all cases relating to the neglect, de-
pendency and delinquency of children who are un-
der eighteen years of age, * * * " 
And, also: 
"Nothing herein contained shall deprive other 
courts of the right to determine the custody of chil-
dren upon writs of habeas corpus, * * * " 
Section 55-10-34, U. C. A. 1953, makes a final judgment or 
order of the juvenile court depriving a parent, custodian 
or guardian of the custody of a child appealable direct to 
the Supreme Court; and, this Court has held that matters 
reviewable on appeal, but which do not go to the juvenile 
court's jurisdiction are not subject to review or collateral 
attack in habeas corpus proceedings. Ex Parte S. H., .. 
Utah , 264 P. 2d 850. Our Court has also held: 
"In habeas Corpus proceedings, nothing is in-
quired into except the legality of the restraint." 
Jones v. Moore, 61 Utah 383, 213 P. 191, 193. 
Chapman v. Graham, Utah ... , 270 P. 2d 
821. 
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From the case of Jensen v. Sevy, 103 Utah 220, 134 
P. 2d 1081, confusion, if any there be, springs. That cause 
was before this Court on an application for writ of man-
damus to compel the district judge to hold a hearing on a 
writ of habeas corpus in a child custody case. An alterna-
tive writ issued directing the court to hold such hearing, 
or to show cause why he did not do so. The court below 
filed an answer joining issue to show cause and justify. 
It was the conclusion and order of the district court that 
that court was without jurisdiction or authority to hear 
or consider the writ of habeas corpus or to make any de-
termination therein with reference to the custody of the 
child. The opinion of Mr. Justice Larson, concurred in by 
Justice Moffat, holds, as the writer interprets that holding, 
that the district court could decline to pass upon questions 
of custody and leave the same for determination by the 
juvenile court under that portion of Section 55-10-5{4), 
U. C. A. 1953, which provides: 
"* * * Such other courts may, however, de-
cline to pass upon question of custody and may cer-
tify the same to the juvenile court for hearing and 
determination or recommendation." 
This leaves, by inference at least, the proposition that the 
district court might, within the exercise of its discretion, 
hear, consider, review and determine matters of custody 
theretofore decreed upon by the juvenile court. In the case 
at bar, the Honorable Judge William Stanley Dunford so 
proceeded, pointing out in his memorandum decision that 
three judges in concurring opinions held, in Jensen v. Sevy, 
supra, that where the juvenile court has obtained jurisdic-
tion of a child because of neglect, dependency or delin-
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quency, the district court must dismiss the writ and it is 
not discretionary, but distinguishing that case from the 
case at bar for the reason that the petitioner there had 
not exhausted his legal remedy by seeking modification of 
the conditional order of the juvenile court (R. 25, 26). 
Let us again reiterate that we are not here complain-
ing of the holding of the district court as to legality of the 
restraint, although we do not admit that such was not 
error. We contend that the finding as to the illegality of 
the restraint entitled the petitioners only to the relief 
sought within the scope of habeas corpus-the discharge 
of the children from custody. Such discharge of the children 
could have been made conditional by the court, either upon 
review of the holding of the district court or upon the out-
come of an appeal from the finding, as to neglect, of the 
juvenile court. Chapman v. Graham, supra. However, we 
earnestly urge that further findings should not have been 
made, nor order thereon issued, depriving the juvenile court 
of its continuing jurisdiction over the children previously 
acquired by that court under authority of Section 55-10-
5 (3), U. C. A. 1953. 
The case of Jensen v. Sevy, supra, also sustains the 
following propositions: 
(A) That the Legislature has the power to give to 
the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction of cases of neglect 
or delinquency of children. 
(B) That the right to the writ of habeas corpus is 
in no way infringed by legislation giving the juvenile court 
exclusive jurisdiction of cases of neglect or delinquency of 
children. 
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(C) That subsection ( 4), 55-10-5, U. C. A. 1953, can-
not be construed to apply to cases in which the State has 
become a party by intervention of the juvenile court. 
As to (C) above, Mr. Justice Hoyt said : 
"* * * To hold otherwise is to hold that by 
reason of subsection ( 4) * * * the district 
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the juven-
ile courts in cases of alleged neglect of children. 
* * *" 
Appellants here contend that if subsection ( 4) of 55-10-5, 
U. C. A. 1953, is to be construed as being applicable to the 
case at bar, the result of such construction would be the 
emasculation of subsection (3) of that statute, which pro-
vides: 
"When jurisdiction shall have been acquired by 
the court in the case of any child, such child shall 
continue for the purposes of such case under the 
jurisdiction of the court until he becomes twenty-
one years of age, unless discharged prior thereto or 
unless he is committed to the state industrial school 
or to the district court as hereinafter provided." 
Therefore, the question presented here resolves itself to 
this-and we ask the Court: 
On the writ of habeas corpus may the district 
court, after disposing of any question of the legality 
of the restraint of a neglected, dependent or delin-
quent child, disturb the previously acquired juris-
diction of the juvenile court by considering questions 
of fitness and custody of a parent or guardian of 
such a child which are reviewable on appeal to the 
Supreme Court, but which do not go to the juvenile 
court's jurisdiction and are not subject to review or 
collateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings? 
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CONCLUSION 
Our Legislature, in its wisdom, has for all practical 
purposes conferred parental powers and duties upon the 
juvenile courts of this State over neglected, dependent or 
delinquent children. There have been vested no such re-
sponsibilities upon the district courts of this State. We 
think it now well settled in this State that if the juvenile 
court has jurisdiction in the premises, its judgment, order, 
or decree is final as to all parties to the proceedings, is 
not subject to collateral attack, and cannot be challenged 
except in a direct action brought in some appellate tribunal. 
Therefore, in the case at bar, it may not be successfully 
contended that the district court could utilize the writ of 
habeas corpus for the purpose of proceedings in error. 
There is no doubt in our mind that had there been no ques-
tion raised as to the legality of the restraint of these chil-
dren, the Honorable Court below would have dismissed the 
writ; and done so upon the ground that the issues raised 
(as to the parents' fitness, right to custody, neglect, de-
linquency, etc.) were not subject to review in habeas corpus 
proceedings. That is the well established law of this State. 
For what reason then should the district court review 
such factual matters in this case? Did such review ac-
complish a desired result? We think not. Sufficient it 
would have been for the district court to have confined its 
findings to the issues raised within the scope of habeas 
corpus. As the record in the cause now stands, we have 
conflicting findings made by the juvenile court and by the 
district court, neither of which are final, which tend only 
to confuse the real issue as to the right to custody of these 
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children. That issue can only be determined through ap-
propriate appeal to this Court. The question as to the 
legality of the restraint, on jurisdictional or constitutional 
grounds, is in no way related to the matters appealable 
directly from the juvenile court to this Honorable Court. 
Should we concede, for the purpose of argument, but not 
admitting the fact, that the restraint was unlawful, would 
not the discharge of the children sought by the petitioners 
for the writ, conditional or unconditional, have accom-
plished the object of, and satisfied the purpose of, the writ 
of habeas corpus. We so conclude. 
The findings of the district court as to whether or 
not the persons subject to the proceedings in the juvenile 
court were neglected children within the meaning of the 
laws of Utah should be set aside and held for naught. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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